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Abstract 
 
Organizations face many challenges in executing offshore-outsourced software development (OOSD) 
projects involving several countries. In such contexts, complex software development efforts are 
exposed to a greater number of risks, which make OOSD projects prone to failures. We analyzed 19 
cases of OOSD project failures to explore the concept of early warning signs (EWS) in OOSD projects 
at the team level. Using the grounded theory methodology, we studied the EWSs specific to OOSD 
project failures. We classified the EWSs of failure into early signals of failure and early warning 
issues in order to help project managers notice the early failing indications. Further, we identified 
and characterized EWSs of failure and divided them into six broad categories. An OOSD project 
failure model incorporating the EWSs of failure was developed to understand the initial stages of 
OOSD project failure. Our research has shed more light on project development failures in 
outsourcing, a rare topic of investigation in information systems research.   
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1 Introduction  
In the past few decades, the world has become smaller in terms of trade and collaboration. Global IT 
outsourcing forms a constantly growing part of the global trade: its global market reached USD 450 
billion per year in 2010, of which offshore outsourcing formed USD 60 billion (Willcocks, Cullen and 
Craig, 2010). While the IT outsourcing market is expected to grow at 5% to 8% per annum, offshore 
outsourcing will likely experience double-digit growth rate for the next 5 years (Lacity et al., 2010). 
Despite the national boundaries that organizations have to cross and the challenges they have to 
overcome in order to participate in the global IT outsourcing market, there seems to be no stopping the 
upward trend of global IT outsourcing in the foreseeable future.  
 
Organizations in high-cost countries have been moving IT activities to low-cost countries like India 
and China primarily because of cost arbitrage. Although software development can be considered an 
ideal activity for global dispersion as it requires little customer contact or physical presence (Apte and 
Mason, 1995), it is also of such a complex nature that success is difficult to achieve even in conditions 
of co-location (Sahay, Nicholson and Krishna, 2003). Captive offshore development – that is, 
development at an extended arm of the organization in a low-cost country – has proven to be a costly 
variant for many organizations. By contrast, outsourcing the software development to a third-party 
organization saves the capital expenditure required in the case of captive outsourcing, and thus 
offshore-outsourced software development (OOSD) has established a compelling case for developing 
information systems in distant countries like India or Russia. However, OOSD projects are exposed to 
a greater number of risks than either onshore-outsourced or captive offshore projects, and thus are 
more prone to failure (Iacovou and Nakatsu, 2008). Many of these risks are offshore-specific, as they 
include cultural differences, linguistic differences, communication difficulties, and work practice 
differences (e.g., Beulen, Ribbers and Roos, 2006; Dibbern, Winkler and Heinzl, 2008). 
 
A review of the literature on IT outsourcing shows that most research focuses on the decision 
processes and the management of IT outsourcing operations on the engagement level rather than on 
the project or operational level (Lacity et al., 2010; Wiener, Vogel and Amberg, 2010). Several 
academics and practitioners have reported on offshore software projects from the implementation 
perspective (e.g., Aron and Singh, 2005; Rottman and Lacity, 2008). However, there has been little in-
depth research about team-level dynamics that cause project failures. Further, little research has been 
done on failures in IT outsourcing projects and software development projects.  
 
Project failure remains a vague concept among practitioners and academics alike, and there seems to 
be no consensus regarding its definition (Pinto and Mantel 1990). Contracts provide the primary form 
of control for IT outsourcing engagements (Kern and Willcocks, 2000). Therefore, we consider the 
fulfillment of contractual obligations the basis of OOSD project success. In this study, we focus on 
software development processes in OOSD projects; in particular, we analyze instances of project 
abandonment or cancellation, which can be considered the extreme form of project failure.  Offshore 
software development project failure is defined as the cancellation of an OOSD project resulting in the 
premature termination of contractual activities between clients and vendors before the information 
system becomes operational. This could include projects that were canceled due to e.g. the vendor’s 
inability to implement the information system as well as projects in which the vendor was replaced or 
the offshore activity terminated.  
 
Software projects continue to fail despite the body of knowledge accumulated over the decades. 
Although there exists “no silver bullet” (Brooks, 1987) for improving project performance, the post-
mortem examination of failure has brought us the insight that significant early warning signs (EWS) 
are found in IT projects before actual project failure (Kappelman, McKeeman and Zhang, 2006). If 
project managers were to take note of a number of indicators, they might be able to perceive these 
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warning signs. For instance, heart patients prior to a heart attack experience early symptoms, such as 
high blood pressure or high cholesterol levels that are early signals of heart problems (Ward, 2003). 
However, symptoms like chest pain and numbness in the left arm can be viewed as late warning signs 
prior to a heart attack. In a manner analogous to the medical example, IT project managers could try to 
draw on the past experiences of other projects and organizations to elicit the EWSs of failure in OOSD 
projects; this could serve as a valuable tool in managing risks in the early project stages. The first 20 
percent of a project’s collaboration forms the critical period for recognizing issues and taking 
corrective measures to complete the project as originally planned.  Since the client and vendor in an 
OOSD project may not work together in the first 20 percent of the project as calculated from the point 
at which the project is initiated at the client organization, we have adopted the following pragmatic 
definition of EWSs for this research: EWS is a project state or indication that warns one about 
possible or impending problems or issues and that occurs in the first 20 percent of the project’s 
cooperation or collaboration period between clients and vendors (based on Kappelman, McKeeman 
and Zhang, 2006). 
 
In order to analyze potentially failure-causing team-level dynamics involved in the early project stages 
of an OOSD project, this exploratory research will attempt to answer the following research questions:  
What are the early warning signs specific to offshore-outsourced software development project 
failures that are related to the project team? How do the project managers perceive them?  
2 Theoretical background  
In his seminal work on strategic issue management, the business economist Ansoff (1975) noted that 
sudden changes in an organization’s environment affect the working environment, which is noticeable 
first as weak signals that become more specific and stronger with the passage of time. Ansoff’s work 
in the area of corporate strategic management offered a framework for minimizing the surprise 
element by anticipating strategic risks. Ansoff and McDonnell (1990) further developed the initial idea 
of weak signals from Ansoff (1975) by explicitly defining weak and strong signals. Weak signals are 
defined as “imprecise, early indications about impending impactful events” and strong signals as 
issues that “will be sufficiently visible and concrete to permit the firm to compute their impact and to 
devise specific plans for response” (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990, p. 20). 
 
Nikander and Eloranta’s (2001) study of EWSs in industrial construction projects found that most of 
the information about EWSs comes from within the project. They identified sixty-eight basic types 
and 11 main type groups of early warnings  on the basis of interviews with 17 project professionals 
and four case projects, and argued that an observed event or indication could be interpreted as a 
warning, a problem, or a cause of the problem depending on the project conditions in the various 
project stages. The interviewees in the study indicated the possibility of utilizing EWS as a project 
management tool. Nikander and Eloranta (2001) further proposed an EWS framework that involves 
monitoring and analysis of early warnings, problems, and causes of problems. They found that 
information related to early warnings could help manage emerging risks and respond to them by 
finding and resolving the causes of the problem.   
 
Havelka and Rajkumar (2006) analyzed the symptoms and causes of troubled information systems (IS) 
projects and found that many symptoms appeared as causes, which is consistent with the observations 
of Nikander and Eloranta (2001). They used the nominal group technique with four focus groups of 20 
IS consultants and identified 108 symptoms of troubled software development projects. Among the 
eleven categories of identified symptoms, team symptoms were also elicited. Havelka and Rajkumar’s 
(2006)  work provides the most comprehensive list of symptoms in the area of software development 
to date.  
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In contrast to the studies on EWSs by Nikander and Eloranta (2001) and Havelka and Rajkumar 
(2006), which examined the whole project lifecycle, Kappelman et al. (2006) studied the first 20 
percent of the project lifecycle. This work in the area of IT projects identified 53 EWSs in three risk 
categories, namely, social subsystem, project management, and technical subsystem. The study 
contained a survey of 157 experienced IT project management experts who rated the identified EWSs; 
the survey aimed to rank the 12 dominant EWSs of IT project failure. All the dominant 12 EWSs were 
social subsystem and project management risks; technical subsystem risks were not included among 
the dominant 12 EWSs.  Though rating EWSs is helpful, Kappelman et al’s (2006) study provides 
only limited help to practitioners, as the EWSs were elicited at the project level with little detailed 
information on how to recognize them concretely. In addition to the above works, our own previous 
research on EWSs in offshore software development projects (captive as well as outsourced) using a 
quantitative Delphi survey established the relevance of team level EWSs. Among the 21 EWSs of 
failure that we elicited, most had to do with team communication and coordination, which shows how 
important interaction among team members in OOSD projects is in avoiding project failures (Philip, 
Schwabe and Wende, 2010). 
 
Klakegg et al.’s (2010) report for the Project Management Institute (PMI), based on interviews and 
eight case studies in Norway, the UK, and Australia, discussed EWSs from the project owners’ or 
governance perspective as opposed to our project management perspective. They differentiated EWSs 
into two types: hard issues of a technical nature, measurable through project assessments, and soft 
issues related to people, identifiable through gut feelings. They recommended paying attention to both 
types in projects, and maintained that the way that EWSs are attended to also affects their detection.  
 
The principal-agent theory explains why it is difficult to perceive EWSs in outsourced software 
projects. The vendor (agent) is assumed to have access to more private information than the client 
(principal); the consequent information asymmetries allow the agent to hide details and actions during 
the engagement (Baiman, 1990). Monitoring difficulties as well as the intangible nature of software 
development make software projects a case of an agency problem. 
3 Research methodology  
We adopted a qualitative research approach, using grounded theory methodology to explore EWSs 
specific to the OOSD environment that lead to failures (Corbin and Strauss, 2008). This was the most 
appropriate methodology to study failed OOSD projects, considering the sensitivity of outsourcing 
failures and the consequent difficulty of gaining access to project details. Semi-structured interviews 
were conducted with project managers at client and vendor companies based in Switzerland and India. 
Interviews, as a data collection method, allowed us to "obtain a rich, in-depth experiential account" of 
failed OOSD projects (Fontana and Frey, 2000). The incomplete script of the semi-structured 
interview type allowed us to improvise questions to obtain rich details of the unique aspects that 
caused failure (Myers and Newman, 2007). 
Project managers (PM) involved in offshore projects at the major multinational organizations located 
in Switzerland were contacted as part of a larger study on failures in OOSD projects. They were 
further asked to recommend other PMs with possible experience of failed OOSD projects. PMs were 
chosen as the key informants since they were the “most knowledgeable and qualified” stakeholder 
involved in failed projects (Glick et al., 1990). Out of 42 interviews, 19 interviews (9 from clients and 
10 from vendors) were used for this research. Twenty-three interviews were not used for the analysis, 
as the failures experienced by those PMs were not OOSD project failures. 
The PMs narrated the details of a major OOSD project failure in their careers. They provided 
information about important project episodes and event chains that described the failure process. Each 
PM had at least two years of OOSD project management experience, and the average amount of 
experience was 7.22 years for client PMs and 6.11 years for vendor PMs. The client and vendor PMs 
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experienced 5.89 and 1.78 OOSD failures, respectively, in their careers, which could point to 
differences in the PMs' context. 
On average, the interviews lasted approximately one hour. They were tape-recorded and transcribed, 
resulting in a total of 255 pages of text. MAXQDA 10 software was used to code and analyze the data. 
We employed open and axial coding schemes (Corbin and Strauss, 2008) to build data categories and 
understand the relationships between the emerging concepts and categories. Open coding was 
employed to delineate concepts from the data in the initial analysis. We then used axial coding to 
relate the concepts that emerged to each other, a total of 91 concepts. During the coding process, we 
applied inductive analysis in order to understand the patterns and relationships between concepts. 
According to Patton (2002, p. 390) in inductive analysis “the patterns, themes, and categories of 
analysis come from the data; they emerge out of the data rather than being imposed on them prior to 
data collection and analysis.” 
 
All projects involved India as the offshore destination, and this study can be considered India-specific. 
The industries represented in the sample include banking, air transport, power generation, public 
sector, insurance, and automotive industries. All projects were executed using the waterfall model, 
except project case Q
1
, which used agile methodology. Typical project phases included requirement 
analysis, design, coding, and integration and testing. Most projects dragged on until the integration and 
testing phase, where the final decision to cancel the project was taken. Cancellation took place earlier 
only in cases F, M, and S, in which the project was canceled during the requirement and analysis 
phase; the lack of business benefits and project management capabilities were noticed early in the 
execution. All the project cancellations took place during the last 10 years and all involved multi-
national organizations. Switzerland was the client country in most projects; other client nations 
included Germany, Singapore, USA, and Canada.  
4 Analysis and discussion 
The analysis of project episodes and event chains that led to failure shows that PMs can notice some 
EWSs of failure in the project directly and some indirectly. Analyzing the data showed that EWSs of 
failures are divided into early indications and issues perceivable directly and those perceivable 
indirectly. Project managers noted issues (Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990) in early project stages that 
warned them of potential problems in the project; we refer to these as early warning issues (EWI). 
EWI is defined as an early project issue that requires attention in the first 20 percent of the project’s 
cooperation or collaboration period between clients and vendors. Nikander and Eloranta (2001) and 
Kappelman et al. (2006) have identified EWSs that fall under the category of EWI; these are difficult 
for PMs to notice during the project. The category of EWSs that offers more concrete warning signals 
that PMs could potentially identify during the project will be referred to as early signals of failure.  
Early signal is defined as a project indication or situation that provides concrete information about 
the early warning issue of failure during the first 20 percent of the project’s cooperation or 
collaboration period between clients and vendors. Early signals of failure in OOSD projects appear as 
weak signals during the start of the project. Nikander and Eloranta (2001), Havelka and Rajkumar 
(2006) and Kappelman et al. (2006) have identified EWSs that are termed early signals in this work.  
 
An EWS of failure manifests itself as a pair of EWI and early signals of failure, where the early 
signals could consist of more than one indicator.  The presence of one or more early signals of failure 
can indicate the existence of EWIs of failure. Early signals of failure may point to the project state or 
condition that requires PMs to analyze whether any EWIs of failures have surfaced or can be 
identified. It should be noted that although the early signals are more concrete and easier to identify, 
                                              
1 We denote 19 anonymous project cases referred to in this paper using the letters A-S. Since we assured anonymity to 
project managers regarding the organizations involved, more details cannot be provided in this paper. 
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they may not point unambiguously to an EWI. For instance, the early signal of missing interaction 
between vendor offshore and onsite teams could indicate that the existence of the warning issue of a 
lack of collaboration between vendor teams. However, this signal could also mean that the vendor 
onshore team lacks the motivation to work with the vendor offshore team. The EWIs of failure may 
become distinct as the project progresses and the presence of other early signals helps the PMs to 
assign the early signals to a particular EWI of failure and thus clearly identify the EWS of failure. 
 
We have analyzed the issue or signal chains and paired early signals with EWIs of failures from 
project cases. Below, we discuss the categories that emerged from this analysis briefly; a more 
extended discussion is precluded by space limitations. The six categories include project team building 
efforts, common project execution structures, awareness of shared work context, collaboration 
between teams, onshore-offshore team coordination capabilities, and team member competencies. 
4.1 Project team building efforts  
A virtual project team that understands its function and consequently makes the requisite effort to  
achieve efficient task fulfillment forms the basis for a successful collaboration. Timely face-to-face 
meetings between client and vendor members could improve the social ties between the offshore and 
onsite members and eventually lead to better rapport and trust. However, since travel between sites is 
expensive, face-to-face meetings remain restricted to a small part of the OOSD project life in order to 
benefit from the cost arbitrage. The project manager of case P recalled that ignoring team-building 
efforts was an early signal that resulted in an incoherent team and eventually led to cancellation: “At 
the expectation end, there was no need to build a team. By definition, there was no team charter. Then 
you have no contract or no rules being defined on how you will behave in presence of conflicts.” 
Table 1 summarizes EWIs of failures regarding project team-building efforts and their early signals 
that emerged from failed projects. The project case is noted in brackets.  
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Missing trust between vendor and client 
teams [A, B, N, O] 
-Efforts of the vendor offshore team not appreciated 
by the client team [O] 
-Opportunity for informal interaction lacking [N, O] 
-Expectation gaps in technical deliverables [A, B] 
Lack of team-building exercises by client 
and vendor [D, K, N, P] 
-Managers ignore team-building efforts [K, P] 
-Lack of project team kickoff meetings [D] 
-Lack of procedures to integrate new team members 
[N] 
Table 1. Team-building efforts 
4.2 Common project execution structures 
A common understanding of the project framework is a prerequisite for executing offshore-outsourced 
projects. In contrast to structured processes like Capability Maturity Model (CMM), we found that 
having mutually accepted structures and expectations about the project management processes is 
crucial for the outcome (Rottman and Lacity, 2008). The project manager of case O remarked that 
missing project structures can lead to a deadlock:  “…the lack of process or the key responsibility 
charged or responsibilities lead to the situation where people find no directions, whether they are 
supposed to do that or not.” Table 2 summarizes EWIs of failures regarding project execution 
structures and their early signals that were found in failed projects. 
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Lack of common understanding about 
deliverables [A, J, L, P] 
-Expectation gaps in deliverables [A, J, P] 
-Lack of explicitly agreed project outputs [L] 
Vendor offshore team fails to honor -Deadlines not met by vendor offshore team [I, J, L] 
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deadlines [A, I, J, L] -Escalations not addressed promptly [A] 
Lack of shared concepts for project 
execution [D, G, K, O] 
-Vendor and client teams have different 
methodologies, documentation, and change 
management processes [D, O] 
-Lack of identical software and hardware versions at 
client and offshore sites [G, K] 
Business requirements not understood 
properly by vendor team members [A, K, L, 
N, P] 
-Expectation gaps in technical deliverables [A, N] 
-Ambiguous requirements with room for 
misinterpretations [K, L, N] 
-Requirement assumptions by vendors are not 
verified [P] 
Table 2. Common project execution structures 
4.3 Awareness of shared work context 
Recognizing differences in the shared work context and the failure to adapt and communicate these 
differences has been identified as one of the EWSs of failure. Cramton (2001) found that virtual team 
members’ lack of skill in detecting local contextual differences and constraints across locations and in 
sharing them with their counterparts caused problems in coordination as well as relationships. The 
organizational culture and work practices of virtual teams further complicate the emergence of a 
shared context between onshore and offshore teams (Cramton and Webber, 2005). The client PM of 
case C noted that the difficulty posed by different organizational cultures for collaboration between 
teams acted as an early signal of project failure: “And the reason is that I think that the teams over 
there are very hierarchical, they have their internal structure of importance and of the supervision and 
it’s difficult to flatten that.” Vendor offshore team members from the Indian organization did not talk 
openly in the presence of their superiors during a meeting or workshop because they followed Indian 
hierarchies and social structures. In this project case, the silence of some of the team members was 
first interpreted as normal, and the client realized only after the first delivery that the offshore team did 
not understand the requirements. Table 3 summarizes EWIs of failures and their early signals that 
emerged from failed projects regarding awareness of shared work context.  
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Escalations not taken seriously by vendor [A, 
B] 
-Assurance of normality by vendor when issues are 
raised [B] 
-Repeated expectation gaps in deliverables [A] 
Vendor onsite team lacks motivation to work 
with offshore team [O] 
-Missing interaction between vendor offshore and 
onsite teams [O] 
-Vendor onsite team does not provide the requested 
information [O] 
Lack of openness to discuss problems by 
vendor offshore team [A, I] 
-Delays of deliverables not communicated in 
advance [A] 
-Non-admission of technical problems or mistakes [I] 
Missing cultural intelligence among vendor 
and client teams  [B, I, L, R] 
-Vendor offshore team members do not challenge 
requirements [I, L] 
-Vendor offshore team members do not talk openly 
in meetings in the presence of superior [C, R] 
-Vendor offshore team members give equal 
importance to family matters as to work [B] 
Table 3. Awareness of shared work context 
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4.4 Collaboration between teams 
Collaboration between teams in the distributed offshore project environment requires team members to 
be aware of how their presence and context relate to those of other members (Dourish and Bellotti, 
1992).  This is because physical distance and cultural differences produce challenges for both formal 
and informal project activities. As the offshore client PM of case O noted with regard to the 
communication setup and collaboration in the project: “It [communication] was not to the level where 
it should have happened. Of course there was some communication, ad-hoc communication, but there 
was no formal team-based communication. So that was one of the reasons, which resulted in a 
situation where the offshore team was truly getting misaligned with the complete project objectives.” 
An overview of EWIs of failures and their early signals that were identified in failed projects in regard 
to team collaboration is given in Table 4. 
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Lack of collaboration between vendor teams 
[B, N, O] 
-Lack of regular meetings [B, N, O] 
-Missing interaction between vendor offshore and 
onsite teams [B, O] 
-Vendor offshore and onsite teams are part of 
independent organizations and both are not 
integrated into the project [B] 
Lack of agreed communication structures 
between vendor and client teams [C, N, O] 
-Communication paths are not clear for team 
members [C, N] 
-Lack of interactions between client and vendor 
teams [N, O] 
Client team mistrusts vendor offshore team 
members [O] 
-Client team member changes use cases without 
informing vendor offshore team [O] 
-Missing interaction between client and vendor 
offshore teams [O] 
-Vendor offshore team not respected or appreciated 
by client team [O] 
Table 4. Collaboration between teams 
4.5 Onshore-offshore team coordination capabilities 
In the organizational setup where the vendor offshore team works as an extended arm of the vendor 
onsite team, it is imperative that both the client and vendor sides acquire the capability to coordinate 
the project team.  Coordinating project resources so they can interact efficiently requires PMs who can 
handle the challenges implicit in the onshore-offshore environment. Project case Q was canceled 
because of lacking interaction between the vendor offshore and onshore teams and lacking knowledge 
feedback mechanisms. The PM noted: “…you need to have a kind of feedback to get clear on what 
needs to be done, why it needs to be done and whether something written in a requirement is a typo or 
that has truly been meant that way.” Table 5 summarizes EWIs of failures and their early signals that 
emerged from the data regarding offshore project management capability.  
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Lack of onshore-offshore team coordination 
know-how by client and vendor [B, E, F, M, 
N, O, P] 
-Neither vendor nor client project managers have  
experience of distributed or virtual projects [M, O, P] 
-Lack of a shared project plan [F] 
-Lack of an integrated organization chart with 
defined contact persons [F] 
-Vendor offshore managers manage large teams [B, 
N] 
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Vendor onsite team fails to transfer 
knowledge to offshore team properly [H, N] 
-Knowledge feedback mechanism shows lack of 
understanding by vendor offshore team [H, N] 
Vendor onsite team simply expects the 
offshore team to provide deliverables based 
on specifications [N, O, P, Q] 
-Lack of regular meetings [N] 
-Lack of knowledge feedback mechanisms [P, Q] 
-Complex knowledge areas not identified [O] 
-Questions from vendor offshore team are blocked by 
vendor onsite team [N, P] 
Table 5. Onshore-offshore team coordination capabilities 
4.6 Team member competencies 
Although the EWS category of team member competencies also applies to non-offshore projects, the 
dynamics of the offshore market – especially the Indian market – call for careful scrutiny of the 
project-related skills and competencies required of team members. Most vendor offshore teams in 
failed projects employed a combination of fresh graduates and senior members. The project manager 
of case A noted the lack of communication skills of offshore team members who had to be replaced: 
“There were two guys who were not very communicative. They were not used to like very open or 
very communicative, so they were keeping silent for most of the time, even on asynchronous 
communication.” This business intelligence project further suffered because of the lack of domain-
specific and technical skills required for its development. Table 6 outlines the EWIs of failures and 
their early signals that emerged from failed projects regarding team member competencies.   
Early warning issues  Early signals 
Vendor offshore team lacks domain-specific 
knowledge [B, K, Q] 
-Knowledge feedback mechanism shows lack of 
adequate business knowledge [Q] 
-Lack of SME in the vendor offshore team [N, Q] 
-Key vendor offshore team members leave the 
project [B, K] 
 Project team cannot elicit business 
specifications thoroughly [E, I, Q] 
-Lack of SME in the vendor onsite or offshore team 
involved in requirement analysis [E, Q] 
-Lack of team member with organization-specific 
knowledge involved in requirement analysis [I] 
 Vendor offshore team members lack 
communication competency [A, B] 
 -Offshore team members are non-communicative or 
silent [A, B] 
 Vendor team members lack required 
technical skills [A, B, C, K, H, Q] 
 
-Bad quality of technical deliverables [A, C, Q] 
-Expectation gaps in technical deliverables [A, K, H] 
-Key vendor offshore team members leave the 
project [B] 
Table 6.  Competencies of team members 
4.7 Towards a model of EWSs in project failure 
The analysis of OOSD project failures provides insight into the initial stages as well as the failure 
process of OOSD projects. As early signals become stronger with improved state of knowledge 
(Ansoff and McDonnell, 1990), the EWI can be identified and the early warning signals determined. 
As opposed to Ansoff’s (1975) focus on events, our model also considers project indications, 
situations and project states. The existence of causes of failure issues (which are project issues that 
eventually lead to project cancellation) will lead to an EWI and further to noticeable early signals. 
Lack of a monitoring mechanism causes PMs to not perceive EWSs. Figure 1 shows the EWSs of 
failure and the OOSD project failure model that emerged from our exploratory data.  
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The principal-agent theory explains why PMs perceive EWSs late in projects. Since vendors possess 
information that clients do not have access to, the state of knowledge will improve only with unfolding 
situations or events (Baiman, 1990). Clients will have to put more effort into reducing the information 
asymmetries. The differentiation of EWSs of failures into more noticeable early signals of failure and 
EWIs of failure forms the main contribution of this work to understanding the early stages of project 
failure.  Imperfect monitoring posed by offshore-specific risks could explain why EWSs are found as a 
pair of early signals and EWI in OOSD projects. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. EWSs of failure and the OOSD project failure model 
 
As a brief illustration of how one EWS of failure was involved in a project failure, let us take project 
case A. In that case, the EWI of the vendor team not honoring deadlines emitted an early signal of 
escalation not being promptly addressed. This eventually led to tensions between client and vendor 
teams that later resulted in failure issues such as non-functioning software coupled with slipping 
timelines and costs overshooting the approved budget. This scenario then led to project failure, i.e., 
cancellation. The root causes of the issues were the lack of offshore project management know-how 
and organizational cultural differences regarding time perception. Vendors considered fulfilling the 
tasks of primary importance, without giving due importance to the milestones.  
 
Further, our analysis found most EWSs to be hard issues of a technical nature that are to a great extent 
measurable. Only four people-related soft issues involving attitudes and values were found among the 
EWSs of failure. They included EWIs like missing trust between vendor and client teams, lack of 
motivation by vendor onshore team to work with offshore team, lack of openness to discussing 
problems by vendor offshore team, and missing trust between client and vendor offshore teams. 
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Williams et al. (2012, p. 47) note that addressing soft issues requires PMs to possess “broad 
experience and a deep understanding of both objectives and culture.”  
5 Conclusions  
We have attempted to identify the early warning signs (EWS) of failure that occur in offshore-
outsourced software development (OOSD) projects and that are related to the team level; we have 
further sought to explain how they are perceived by project managers (PM). Our analysis of OOSD 
project failures points to the necessity of dyadic client-vendor team-level interactions and the 
appropriate responses to these if project failure is to be avoided. Especially the dynamics within the 
vendor onsite and vendor offshore teams were found to have an equal role, as opposed to the client 
and vendor offshore teams mainly found in the IS offshoring literature.  
 
This research makes three main contributions to the IS failure and offshoring streams. Firstly, we have 
developed a causal model of OOSD project failure that incorporates EWSs of failure; this helped us 
understand the process of OOSD project failure. Practitioners could use our OOSD project failure 
model as a guideline for reducing offshore-specific risks. Research has found that risks are perceived 
differently by project managers on different continents, who have different cultural orientations 
(2001). Practitioners could also further address the EWSs in the categories of common project 
execution structures and team collaboration related to cultural values and practices. Secondly, we have 
distinguished the concept of EWSs found in the IS literature into early warning issues (EWI) and their 
easily identifiable early signals of failure. Early signals of failure helped us understand how PMs 
might be able to better perceive the EWSs of failures that surface in early project stages. Thirdly, we 
have identified and characterized the EWSs of failure in OOSD projects at the team level. 
The main limitation of our research is its India-centricity, as that could point to bias in the data; 
however, a homogenous cultural sample involving a single vendor country enabled us to develop 
generalizations. We tried to ensure the accuracy of the data from the retrospective interviews by 
minimizing recollection errors (Glick et al., 1990) through focusing on major events in one failed and 
one successful project in PMs' careers. Lack of triangulation from the PM on the other side shows a 
bias in results. However, we believe to have shed more light on failures in IS projects, a rare topic of 
investigation. While further research ideally would involve case studies including both parties of a 
failure, such research remains highly sensitive. As an alternative, scholars could undertake surveys to 
validate the qualitative data offered in this work. 
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